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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The Working Paper series
The Robert Schuman Centre’s Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development of interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European 
Union in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of 
attention. The scope and style of papers in the series is varied, however, two 
areas of research have been prioritized:
1/ The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices of the Centre’s Programme,
as well as researchers at the Institute, are eligible to contribute.
This paper was written for a meeting of the Reflection Group on the Diversity 
and Unity in the Enlarged European Union, set up jointly by the Robert 
Schuman Centre and the Group of Advisors at the European Commission, and 
chaired by Professor Jean-Luc Dehaene. The European University Institute and 
the Robert Schuman Centre are not responsible for the proposals and opinions 
expressed by the author. For information on this and other projects on Eastern 






















































































































































































The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe offered a unique 
opportunity for institutional redesign. At the heart of much of the initial 
institutional change in the region was a desire to build modem democratic 
states, invariably, though not exclusively, following West European templates. 
Throughout the course of the 1990s, however, a more influential mechanism 
emerged stimulating institutional convergence in Central and Eastern Europe: 
the European Union (EU). The desire of Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) to join Europe’s best and wealthiest club helped engender the 
replication of Western European institutions in CEEC, reminiscent of the 
process of institutional unification which took place in non-Communist Europe 
after World War Two. The process of institutional convergence in CEEC has 
not been encouraged and undertaken to achieve institutional uniformity, rather 
the aims have been the establishment of democratic forms of government #nd 
democracy as the only game in town, allowing room for institutional diversity 
within a democratic framework.
Even a cursory examination of constitutional changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe reveals several commonalties in overall institutional design. The 
prevailing institutional model involves parliamentary democracy, a proportional 
representation electoral system, multiparty systems, coalition governments and 
constitutional review. During the last decade several applicant countries have 
shifted towards this pattern, even if their constitutions and electoral laws 
originally provided for some forms of mixed types of government, such as semi- 
presidentialism and mixed electoral formulas.
The ‘new institutional architecture’1 adopted by CEEC is largely the 
outcome of domestic political forces, but the demands of the EU are playing an 
increasingly important role. The EU requires of its prospective members not just 
democratic rules and institutions, but also the absorption of its own body of 
laws, the acquis communautaire. Inherent in this dual demand is a tension. On 
the one hand, the broadly defined political criteria have allowed political 
leaders to settle institutional battles and to craft such institutional models that 
allow flexibility, lessen the stakes in politics and minimize zero-sum solutions, 
but on the other the acquis has demanded strict conformity. Incorporating the 
EU’s laws which run to around 80 000 pages and have been built up over 
decades, could be a long and labourious process. In order to speed up the 
process and to keep membership from becoming a distant dream, many CEEC 
have adopted fast-track mechanisms to allow speedy incorporation of the 
acquis.




























































































This article explores a paradoxical theme: whilst the EU has been at the 
forefront of encouraging the building of democratic institutions in CEEC, the 
demands of the acquis may hinder the consolidation of consensual institutional 
frameworks in countries where political actors, their identities and interests are 
still not settled and the stability of parties and party systems remain rather 
fragile. The institutional framework that has emerged in CEEC is probably the 
most conducive to the consolidation of democracy, but the rapid adoption of the 
acquis may undermine the positive effects of the institutions of consensual 
democracy on political actors. Such fast-track procedures may harm democratic 
consolidation in the longer-term, because they may lessen the legitimacy of 
democratic government. The impact of fast-tracking is a symptom of a deeper 
problem. Effective governance requires some degree of flexibility and 
institutional diversity. Pressure towards uniformity can, if taken too far, be 
inimical to efficacious governance. Just as golfers are allowed to pick which 14 
clubs they play with, so the states of the enlarged EU should have the right to 
choose whether to pick the institutional equivalent of the sand wedge or another 
driver to suit their circumstances, traditions and needs. There is, as Wallace 
argues, ‘in the more mechanical process of EU enlargement’ the need to 
recognise the value of indigenous practice and preference.2
After a brief discussion of the EU’s membership criteria, this article will 
map the process of institutional development in CEEC in the past decade. The 
article charts the path of institutional change throughout the region during the 
1990s and, drawing in part on Helen Wallace’s distinction between 
‘Europeanisation’ and ‘EU-isation’ assesses the impact of Europe (in both the 
political and geographical sense) on institutional development.3
The Requirements for Those Who Wish to Join the Club
Before embarking on an attempt to chart the progress of institutionalisation in 
CEEC, it is worth reviewing briefly the EU’s membership requirements. To join 
any club applicants have to demonstrate they are suitable members. The EU is 
no exception. At the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, the EU 
outlined the political criteria for membership. Applicants were required to 
demonstrate the ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’.4 The criteria
2 H. Wallace T h e  Domestication o f Europe and the Limits to Globalisation’ paper delivered 
to IPSA Congress, Quebec, August 2000
3 H. Wallace ‘The Domestication of Europe’
4 Council o f the European Union Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council 




























































































were broad and did not prescribe any particular institutional model. Indeed, 
given the variety of institutional forms between different EU member states 
such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, it would have been 
distinctly odd for the EU to have demanded applicant nations conform to a 
specific institutional model.
The EU’s criteria therefore provided ample room for institutional 
variation, allowing CEEC to establish democratic institutions in accordance 
with their own political traditions and culture. Initially, a range of different 
formal institutions and political rules emerged, but a decade on from the 
revolutions of 1989 many commonalities in the general political set-up among 
the applicant countries are discernible. Moreover, the key state institutions have 
become to resemble those of Western Europe. This process of institutional 
convergence is likely to contribute to overall democratization and stability in 
the continent, because it increases predictability, i.e. political actors in CEEC 
are increasingly expected to behave at the state level according to the 
democratic rules of the game. At the same time, this convergence provides 
sufficient room for institutional diversity at lower levels.
The requirements for joining the EU in the current decade differs from 
previous enlargements, most notably the southern European enlargement of the 
1980s, because membership clearly depends not just on economic factors, but 
on political conditions which have become explicit requirements of entry. In the 
cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain, European Community membership was 
considered part of the process of democratic consolidation rather than a reward 
for achieving consolidation.
Mapping the Process of Institutionalisation in Central and Eastern Europe
Although political actors formulate policies and make decisions, they do so 
through institutional frameworks. Political institutions matter because they 
provide agency with formative incentives and disincentives that shape both the 
strategies pursued and the goals achieved.5 Nonetheless, it should be
in Karen Henderson (ed.) Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European 
Union (London: UCL Press 1993) pp. 3-22, particularly pp. 7-8
5 S. Haggard & M. D. McCubbins (eds.) Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2001); S. Steinmo, K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds.) Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1992); A. Przeworski, ‘Democracy as A Contingent Outcome o f Conflicts’ 
in J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 





























































































emphasized that institutional frameworks are not conjured up out of thin air, 
they are created by political actors and are the product of bargaining and 
negotiation. A major shift in power relations may, therefore, lead to 
modifications, changes or even a drastic overhaul of an institutional framework. 
Throughout central and eastern Europe in the past decade there has been a 
decrease in the occurrence of major institutional change, which has allowed the 
constitutional arrangements to acquire stability and value. What change there 
has been has resulted in a trend of institutional framework convergence across 
Central and Eastern Europe.
In order for a social arrangement to be called an 'institution', two 
conditions have to be met. First, institutions play a socializing role in that they 
prescribe desirable and proscribe undesirable behaviour. In other words, they 
restrict modes of actions (negative part) and reward preferable activities 
(positive part). Second, institutions do not only perform the role of ‘congruent 
socialization’6 but should also function correctly, i.e. should be able to solve 
problems they were created to cope with. In short, institutions impose 
obligations upon actors as well as produce policy outcomes.
The initial constitution-making process in CEEC yielded a wide variety 
of constitutional structures. This diversity was a product of the inputs into the 
decision-making process. Inherited structures, historical experiences, political 
actors’ preferences during the transition, deal sweeteners during the round-table 
talks, a concern for historical continuity, in Central and Eastern Europe’s case, 
‘the European inheritance of parliamentarism’7 and the pull of the European 
Union all played their part. The output of each constitution-making process was 
determined by the differing mix of these ingredients in CEEC. The constitution- 
makers were not operating in a genesis environment. Constitutions had existed 
before 1989. Under communist rule, however, constitutions were reduced to 
little more than extensions of Communist party programmes designed to lend a 
‘veneer of legality to monocratic rule.’ 8 In framing the institutional structure
Basis o f  Politics (New York: Free Press 1989); J. March and J. Olsen ‘The New 
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’ American Political Science Review 
78, no3, September 1984, pp. 734-49.
6 C. Offe ‘Designing Institutions in East European Transitions’ in J. Elster, C. Offe and U. K. 
Preuss Institutional Design In Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) pp. 199-226.
7 M. S. Shugart ‘The inverse relationship between party strength and executive strength: a 
theory of constitutional choices’ British Journal o f Political Science voi 28, 1998, ppl-29 at
P' 28
K. Williams ‘Constitutional Choices and Separation o f Powers in East Central Europe’ 




























































































politicians looked to three models: the ‘distant past’, the modem West and the 
‘accomplishments of the immediate past of the state socialist system.’9
The largely formal and empty texts of the Communist times have been 
replaced with democratic constitutions on the Western model. Concepts at the 
heart of all democracies such as the division of powers and human rights were 
enshrined in these documents. The constitutions established the guiding 
principles regulating the rules and procedures through which actual policy 
outcomes are reached. These rules of the game are enshrined in the constitutions 
and invariably require specific procedures such as constitutional assemblies and 
extraordinary majorities in order to be changed. Although the desire to construct 
democracies was at the heart of much constitution making in CEEC in the early 
1990s, it is worth reiterating these constitutions were drawn up not by saints, 
but by politicians driven in part by their own personal political interests. 
Framers may have offered impartial arguments based on concepts such as the 
public good, individual rights or democracy, but the motivation may have had 
much to do with their own self-interest and ‘the position in which politicians 
find themselves at the time of design’10 As an outcome of a bargaining process, 
constitutions therefore ‘resemble bundles of compromises rather than acts of 
legal professionalism’.11 Nevertheless, despite their human frailties political 
players have been able to solve institutional conflicts under valid rules of the 
game; a sign of their commitment to democratic procedure.
(a) The Separation of Powers
Many CEEC began the process of the institutionalisation of democracy with 
vaguely drafted constitutions. The provisions specifying the separation of 
powers in particular tended to be ambiguous.12 Such ambiguity, allowing 
varying interpretation, allied with weak checks and balances, was a recipe for 
outcomes not conducive to the consolidation of democratic polities. Hence, 
some constitutions, instead of being capable of solving political crises, 
themselves became the source of political conflicts. The position, role and 
powers of the presidency, for instance, have led to countless controversies. In
9 J. Elster, C. Offe and U. K. Preuss Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: 
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press 1998) p l5
10 Shugart, ‘The inverse relationship’ p2
11 S. Holmes( 1995) ‘ Conceptions of Democracy in the Draft Constitutions o f Post-Communist 
Countries’ in B. Crawford (ed.) Markets, States and Democracy (Boulder: Westview 1995) 
pp. 71-81 at p. 73
12 J. Zielonka ‘New Institutions in the Old East Block’, Journal o f Democracy, 5(2), 1994, 
pp. 87-104;





























































































part this may be a legacy of the communist tradition of (at least nominal) 
collective leadership. With the exception of Czechoslovakia and Romania a 
single head of state was, to some extent, an institutional novelty.
Poland has witnessed significant shifts in the relative positions of 
president, government and parliament throughout the 1990s.13 With at least half 
a nod towards Poland’s institutional history, but also an outcome of the 
bargaining process, the 1989 round table discussions created a strong, but 
indirectly elected president. The Head of State was accorded powers to veto 
legislation with a two-thirds override requirement for both houses of 
parliament, to dissolve the legislature, and gave the office holder executive 
control over defence and foreign policy ministerial appointments. Thanks in 
large part to Lech Walesa’s desire to increase his power he pushed for a more 
powerful presidency. Parliament rejected Walesa’s constitutional plans which 
envisaged a shift in power in favour of the Head of State. In fact the balance of 
power shifted in the other direction. Under first the so-called ‘Little 
Constitution’ in 1992 and then more significantly the 1997 Constitution the 
powers of the cabinet and the Prime Minister increased at the expense of the 
president. The President retains veto power, but can be overridden by a majority 
of three-fifths of MPs, not two-thirds, as in the previous constitution. The 
Presidential power to dissolve parliament was also curtailed. (S)he can do it 
only when parliament fails to enact the budget within four months and when the 
government is unable to form a cabinet. In addition, presidential power over the 
nomination of ministers was curtailed. Polish constitutional development, 
therefore, provides a good example of a shift from a hybrid system towards a 
more clear-cut parliamentary democracy. Although Poland ended up with a 
balance of power between president, prime minister and parliament typical of 
many EU members, the cause appears more likely to be found in personalities 
and internal political debates and arguments than in any attempt to adopt a 
European model.
Slovakia’s hastily drafted constitution of 1992 incorporated countless 
vague and contradictory rules. Although most of the provisions were typical of 
parliamentary democracies, several unclear powers, typical of semi-presidential 
systems, were vested in the presidency. Thanks in part to the lack of 
constitutional clarity, but also to an almost visceral hatred between the two 
office holders, President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, 
Slovakia experienced tense relations between prime minister and president in 
the mid-1990s. In January 1999, the new parliament passed an amendment to
13 G. Sanford ‘Parliamentary Control and the Constitutional Definition o f Foreign Policy 
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the Constitution, which not only provided for direct elections of the president, 
but also limited the head of state’s power. The President, for instance, lost 
his/her power to preside over the cabinets meetings and to intervene in the 
process of forming a government and may impose a veto on regular laws, not on 
“constitutional laws,” (i.e. laws passed by a 3/5 majority in parliament). As in 
the Polish case it is hard to argue the motivation for these constitutional changes 
was the EU. The constitutional amendment passed in 1999 had more to do with 
the outcome of the coalition formation discussions in late 1998 and a desire to 
avoid a repeat of the Slovak parliament’s failure to elect a new president after 
Kovac’s term had expired in March 1993, leaving the country without a 
president.
A process of constitutional convergence is discernible across the region. 
Most CEEC constitutions now have a weak head of state, even where the 
president is directly elected, who plays mostly a symbolic role and intervenes in 
politics only in explicitly defined cases to limit institutional conflicts. A notable 
exception to this trend is Romania, which retains a semi-presidential system 
based on the French model. Under the 1991 constitution, for instance, the 
President and not the legislature nominates the Prime Minister. The lack of clear 
constitutional rules concerning the dismissal of the Prime Minister has led to 
political disputes. While the 1991 dismissal of Petre Roman by President 
Illiescu did not raise controversy, the 1999 removal of the Prime Minister Radu 
Vasile by President Constantinescu has provoked institutional disagreement, 
which the Constitutional Court refused to interpret. Nonetheless, a more typical 
development has been that witnessed by Romania’s southern neighbour 
Bulgaria. Through her institutional trials and tribulations in the early 1990s, 
particularly the severe tensions between president Zhelyu Zhelev and his prime 
ministers Philip Dimitrov and Ljuben Berov’4, Bulgaria appears to have found a 
balance of power through a process of simultaneous learning.
(b) Executive Leadership
In general, constitutions in CEEC give little guidance about the organization of 
cabinets. Usually constitutions state that decisions are to be taken collectively 
or they assign a particular role to the Prime Minister. This situation is not, 
however, unique to CEEC. Cabinet decision-making in Western Europe is often 
more a matter of practices than of constitutional rules. Parliaments play an 
important role in cabinet formation thanks to the fact that in most CEEC newly 
formed cabinets have to pass some form of parliamentary investiture.
14 V. I. Ganev (1999) ‘Bulgaria’ in Robert Elgie (ed.) Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford 




























































































Dependent as it is on the constitutional positions of the president and 
parliament and the nature and strength of parliamentary parties, the position of 
prime minister in the matrix of power, differs significantly throughout Central 
and Eastern Europe. The constitutions of most CEEC provide for a weak prime 
ministerial leadership, although both the Hungarian and Polish constitutions 
include provisions strengthening the position of the prime minister. Not 
everything, however, is down to the wording of the constitutions. The relatively 
strong position of the premier in the Czech Republic seems to have less to do 
with the constitutional arrangement and more to do with the political context 
particularly the relative stability of party system, the cohesion and party 
discipline of the ruling political parties and inter-party cooperation. Moreover, 
the former Slovak prime minister Vladimir Meciar was not immune from 
ignoring the provisions of the constitution to increase his control over political 
system.
In addition to constitutional limitations, prime ministers in CEEC are also 
hampered by political limitations on their power. The cabinet they chair is 
invariably not of their own making. They do not have a free hand to ‘hire and 
fire’ ministers. In many CEEC prime ministers can be forced to accept 
parliamentary decisions on the dismissal and appointment of individual 
ministers. More significantly, the selection of cabinet members is more often 
the result of bargaining between coalition partners than a purely prime 
ministerial decision. In the post-fascist democratic transition in Germany and 
Spain constitution crafters designed the position of prime minister carefully to 
help promote stability in the polity, most notably through the introduction of the 
constructive vote of no-confidence. In contrast the constitutional arrangement 
of the executive, and in particular the position of the premier, in CEEC did not 
receive as much attention as in the German and Spanish case. Indeed, the 
relative neglect of the premier’s position marks a clear deviation from the 
Western European model. The failure to devote adequate attention to the 
position of the prime minister could have significant implications for the future 
of CEEC. Stable executives not only assist applicant countries in their quest for 
EU membership, but they also strengthen the position of member states within 
the EU structures. Although a sweeping generalization, it appears clear a strong 
and united government can achieve more within European structures than a 
weak and divided one.
There is a general agreement about the poor performance of CEEC 
executives in general.15 Among the reasons for this dissatisfying functioning of
-----------------------------  «
15 Zielonka ‘New Institutions’; R. Taras ‘The politics o f  Leadership’ in S. White, J. Batt & P. 































































































the executive is not so much their weak constitutional powers as a general lack 
of experience on the part of new ministerial elites. The very structure and 
organization of cabinet has been under constant review. Almost every new 
government has changed the structure of ministers and ministries,, (4^v?> 
committee systems, and some have also altered procedures of decision-making. 
Such tinkering is not unique to CEEC. Western Europe has also endulged in 




The nature of coalition government has complicated cabinet formation 
and operation. Fragmented and unstable party systems, often accompanied by 
high polarization, have hampered the rule of the executive. Moreover, lack of 
trust among coalition partners has necessitated detailed coalition and policy 
agreements. Such documents often include not just a description of the spoils of 
office - which party gets control of which ministry -  but also outline policy. 
Detailed agreements can form the basis of stable government, but as the current 
(1998-) Slovak government has demonstrated, both differing interpretations of 
these texts and problems not explicitly dealt with in the documents can cause 
tensions and difficulties between the coalition partners. In order to resolve 
difficulties between coalition partners, pre-cabinet bodies such as coalition 
councils have been instituted. Even the existence of such institutions, however, 
does not preclude cabinet meetings from degenerating into opportunities for 
parties to criticize the policies of their partners in government. The Czech 
Republic has employed an unusual mechanism for promoting stability, the so- 
called opposition agreement, between the Social Democrats (CSSD) and the 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS). After the 1998 elections CSSD fell short of an 
overall parliamentary majority. Rather than form a regular minority government, 
CSSD leader Milos Zeman signed a pact with his sworn enemy ODS’ Vaclav 
Klaus, allowing CSSD to govern in return for policy guarantees and control of 
important parliamentary bodies. Although the agreement provoked howls of 
disagreement amongst the smaller parties excluded from even a sniff of power, 
and has at times been awkward for both sides, it has achieved its overriding aim 
of providing Czechs with a stable government.
In most CEE countries cabinet meetings tend to be lengthy and time- 
consuming procedures, with the exception of Hungary where a sophisticated 
hierarchical and multi-level system of government was established. The 
complicated procedures and relations among coalition parties can undermine the 
administrative capacity of the executive. CEEC could benefit from assistance or 
advice from the EU in this regard, because the political context and the party 




























































































Executives are dependent on bureaucracies to implement policy. The 
concept of a ‘neutral’ state bureaucracy was not prevalent in CEEC in the early 
1990s. The boundaries between political and administrative appointments have 
been established only gradually. In the first half of 1990s, the general pattern of 
the ruling political parties was to replace as much of staff as it was possible in 
the state administration, which undermined the overall performance of the 
government. In response to the constant chopping and changing of bureaucrats, 
one of the top priorities of the National Accession Partnership Programmes was 
to pass civil service related legislation to limit the high turnover of personnel in 
the state administration and to stabilize the positions and competencies of 
officials. The aim of such legislation is to foster political independence and 
reduce the scope for political interventions in the appointment of officials. The 
EU deserves praise in this regard. Without the EU’s pressure it is not clear, most 
notably in the Czech and Slovak cases, whether political parties would have 
been willing to pass such legislation. Reform of the state administration aimed 
at achieving a politically impartial and rationalized bureaucracy, however, is 
hampered by two factors. Firstly, the existing terms and conditions of those 
officials currently in place; and secondly, the comparatively low levels of 
salaries in the public administration compared to the private sector are not 
attractive for well-educated young people. Low salaries also reinforce the 
incentives for increased corruption in the state sector.
In contrast to Western Europe, some CEEC incorporated NGOs in the 
process of the government, taking over public administration functions 
normally performed by the government. In Bulgaria, for example, the training of 
governmental staff was organized by NGOs and not by the state institutions. In 
Slovakia, for instance, some bills were drafted with the assistance of NGOs. 
The fact that some institution building was undertaken by NGOs suggests that 
when the state is weak, civil society may take over its functions and act as a 
democratic consolidator.
(c) The Place of Parliaments
The new constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe tend to accord a greater 
role for legislatures than most of the recent Western European constitutions, 
such as the 1949 German Constitution, the 1958 French constitution, and the 
1978 Spanish Constitution.16 The more elevated status of parliaments is in part a 
product of the legacy of communist rule, when theoretically at least, the 
constitutions invested all power in parliament, but part of the explanation is also 
to be found in the process of democratic transition. In the initial stages of
16 J-E Lane and S. Ersson The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes 




























































































transition parliaments served a dual purpose, not just as an ordinary legislature, 
but also as a constituent assembly. Thanks to their ‘institutional self-interest’ 
the constituent assemblies crafted institutions with a more powerful role for the 
legislature17. At the beginning of institutional crafting, for example, the Polish 
and Romanian parliaments were given the power to override the rulings of the 
constitutional courts. Whether the relatively exalted status of parliaments in 
CEEC compared to their legislative cousins in Western Europe is desirable or a 
portent of troubles ahead when CEEC join the EU is an open question. There 
are so many variable factors, not least the personalities and party programmes of 
future parliamentary deputies, that it would be unwise to predict an outcome. 
The EU would, however, be well advised to think through possible scenarios 
and either prepare contingency plans and nip possible future problems in the 
bud.
The choice between a unicameral or bicameral parliament was rather 
contingent. In so far as a pattern can be observed, it follows that which has been 
noted in the rest of Europe, with unicameral legislatures existing in countries 
with small populations. Two of the region’s largest countries, Poland and 
Romania, opted for bicameral legislatures. The decision of the Czechs to 
institute a Senate had less to do with concerns of size than historical traditions, 
institutional self-interest and political bargaining. Slovenia’s upper chamber 
with its advisory function and recruitment by appointment appears to be more 
the legacy of the self-governing regime in the former Yugoslavia, than the 
outcome of considered institutional choice.
Whether bicameral or unicameral parliaments are powerful actors in the 
political process in CEEC, although the extent of their power varies from 
country to country. Parliaments in CEEC tend to enjoy many powers over the 
establishment, replacement and suspension of the executive, judicial bodies and 
their incumbents. Although the institutional framework creates the parameters 
of the parliaments’ power, the extent to which parliaments can use this power is 
dependent on non-institutional factors such as the composition of parliament, 
the party system, and party discipline and cohesion.
Thanks to fractious parliaments and unstable coalitions, the legislative 
process can be long and drawn-out. One might expect unicameral systems to 
have speedy legislative processes. According to the European Commission’s 
annual reports the legislative process in most applicant countries has been rather 
slow, even in those with one chamber parliaments. The reasons vary from 
country to country. One of the most important of which is the existence of 
parliamentary rules and procedures. In most CEEC, for example, standing




























































































orders usually require three readings to adopt any piece of legislation. Each 
reading takes time. If all laws relating to the implementation of the acquis went 
through this procedure CEEC would consume enormous amounts of legislative 
time and would be left with far less time to deal with purely domestic laws and 
would put a brake on fulfilling accession aspirations. CEEC have resolved this 
problem by instituting shortened procedures for acquis related laws.
In Bulgaria, for example, the National Assembly set up a Council on 
European Integration, chaired by the Speaker to consider all draft laws related 
to the adoption of the acquis. It is made up of three members from each of the 
five parliamentary groups, which are represented on an equal and non­
proportional basis. Where the Council members agree there is consensus on a 
draft law, the Council can replace the committees and send a draft law straight 
to the plenary for a vote, thus speeding up procedures. However, should one 
parliamentary group object, the draft law must go through the normal 
procedures. Such a procedure appears wise and well thought-out, enabling rapid 
incorporation of acquis-related laws where general consensus exists, but where 
initial agreement is absent, consensus is valued higher than raw speed. In a 
similar vein to the Bulgarian model, the Czech Republic’s lower chamber has 
amended its rules of procedure to introduce a fast track possibility for EU 
related laws. Prior to the submission of legislative drafts by the government to 
the parliament, ministers discuss the matter with the Committee for European 
Integration.
Slovenia’s Parliament also treats EU-related laws as a legislative priority 
and has used extraordinary sessions to speed up their adoption. The European 
Commission remained critical, complaining that ‘the legislative process is still 
slow and no progress has been made in streamlining the parliamentary 
process’18, because every law still requires three readings and acquis related 
laws are not allowed to jump the legislative queue. All laws are dealt with in the 
order they are submitted to parliament. Criticism of the slow pace of legislation 
has stimulated the Slovenes into introducing an accelerated procedure for 
adopting EU-related laws, where three readings were held within one or a few 
days. To legitimise these procedures the ruling political parties pushed for the 
adoption of a new Parliament Standing Order, which would shorten the current 
three-reading procedure, and limit the speaking time of parliamentarians. Due to 
difficulties in obtaining a 2/3 majority in parliament, this attempt to change the 
current standing order has so far been unsuccessful.





























































































More drastic tactics have been adopted in Romania, where the fragile 
ruling coalition in the highly fragmented parliament was able to pass only 59 of 
the 453 (!) bills in 1999. The government have tried to circumvent a parliament 
with more than its fair share of un-cooperative MPs by issuing extraordinary 
decrees, which immediately enter into force and need only retrospective 
approval by parliament. However, the frequent use of this governmental 
procedure although backed up by the constitution, may distort the 
institutionalisation of democratic legislature and weaken the state 
administrative capacity.
Fast-tracking for EU-related laws has important consequences for the 
institutionalisation of democratic norms. Attracted by the lure of joining the 
club that flows with milk and honey, applicant nations have cast aside the 
norms typical of democratic legislatures. Regular parliamentary procedure, 
which provides for several steps in making legislation ensures that all political 
forces in the parliament can provide input into the legislative drafting process, 
but slows down the process. The speedy procedures for the acquis related 
legislation run the risk of reducing parliaments to little more than rubber stamps 
and may undermine the overall institutionalisation of parliaments and weaken 
their legitimacy. In particular, the consolidation of committee system may 
suffer, because whenever fast-tracking is adopted committees tend to be 
bypassed. Committees play an important role in fostering habits of political 
bargaining and cross-party cooperation. Fast-tracking will therefore hamper the 
emergence of these habits.
The institutional effectiveness of parliament depends in part on the men 
and women who sit in the chambers. Many of the new parliamentarians in the 
early 1990s were, by and large, inexperienced in parliamentary affairs. 
Although the situation has general improved over the past decade, as the recent 
Lithuania example showed, the number of inexperienced newcomers can still be 
high. In the early post-communist days deputies were also hampered by the 
lack of support staff and general resources, a situation much improved in the 
past ten years or so. The performance of the parliaments is also dependent on 
the political context. Parliamentary party discipline and cohesion, or the lack of 
them, have complicated matters sometimes blurring the distinction between 
government and opposition. Fluid party systems and weak party loyalty 
amongst deputies result in shifting coalitions and changes in government. A 
pattern which appears to be particularly true in the smaller countries such as the 
Baltic States and Slovenia.
Parliaments throughout Central and Eastern Europe have begun 




























































































effectiveness, organizational articulation and rule abiding patterns of behaviour 
have been or are being acquired. In terms of organization, membership and 
procedures, the institutional capacity of parliaments has been gradually 
increasing, and has been assisting in the institutionalisation of democracy in the 
region.
(d) Electoral Systems
The choice of electoral system is important because it helps to shape a country’s 
party system19 and consequently also its institutional framework, i.e. the 
composition of the parliament, the form of executive, and the overall profile of 
executive-legislative relations. The chosen electoral system plays a significant 
role in explaining the degree of fragmentation of parliaments and thus 
influences the creation and durability of governments which depend on the 
enduring confidence of a parliamentary majority. In creating the electoral 
system a number of choices need to be made. The most obvious choice is that 
between majoritarian, proportional or mixed formulas, but other issues such as 
open versus closed party lists, preference voting, thresholds, assembly size, 
district magnitude and different mechanisms employed to count the votes 
(Hagenbach-Bischoff/Droop, D’Hondt, STV, Imperiali etc.) are important and 
can be of significance.20
In accordance with the prevailing norms in Western Europe, CEEC have 
tended to opt for proportional representation electoral systems rather than using 
the plurality formula. Hungary and Lithuania with their mixed PR/plurality 
systems are exceptions to this general trend. Even within PR, however, there are 
variations. Just as Western European systems differ as to the number and 
magnitude of constituencies, the existence and type of party list and the 
methods for counting votes and remainders, so the PR systems instituted in 
CEEC differ from each other. As the Polish experience shows, the introduction 
of thresholds, for example, can have a ‘reductive effect’21 on the number of 
parties in parliament and therefore increase govemability, but it can also nullify 
the votes of a significant portion of the electorate. Indeed, in elections in the 
early 1990s around a quarter of Czechs, Slovaks and Bulgarians voted for
19 M. Duverger Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New 
York: Wiley
1954); R. Taagerpera and M. S. Shugart Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f 
Electoral Systems (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1989)
20 Elster et al ‘Institutional Design’; M. Gallagher ‘Comparing Proportional Representation 
Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities’ British Journal o f Political 
Science, 22, 1992, pp. 469-96
21 G. Sartori Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives 




























































































parties which failed to cross the respective thresholds. This fact highlights an 
important broader point. Whatever the constraining effects of the electoral 
systems might be, these may be mitigated by the degree of institutionalisation of 
the party system.22
The initial decision to opt for PR was in part a desire to emulate Western 
European democracies, but it was also the product of political traditions, the 
political bargaining process, an aversion to the idea of one-party rule and the 
desire to foster political pluralism.23 With the exceptions of Poland and Bulgaria 
(which will be discussed below), none of the applicant countries seriously 
considered a plurality electoral system as a possible solution, although 
conventional political science wisdom asserts that this arrangement is more 
likely to enhance political stability in the form of government durability than 
proportional electoral formulas.
Despite the fact that Poland’s 1989 electoral law provided for a plurality 
system it was soon abandoned. Thanks to the fracture of both major party 
groupings a new round of electoral system negotiation began. Given the fact 
that in a fragmented party system no individual actor could hope to benefit from 
plurality voting rules, most Polish legislators favoured and adopted a party list 
PR system. The upshot of this new arrangement was a proliferation of parties in 
parliament and the inability to create a stable government. In response, most 
legislators backed the introduction of a threshold requirement typical of 
Western European democracies. One of the unexpected outcomes of this 
attempt at ‘institutional engineering’ was the elimination of several post- 
Solidarity parties who had backed the threshold’s introduction from the 
parliament.
Initially Bulgaria opted for a mixed electoral system combining multi­
member district proportional representation with a 4 percent threshold and 
single-member district majoritarian representation. After the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) began losing support, however, the BSP led a successful reform of 
the process resulting in a closed-list, multi member district proportional 
representation system which favoured larger parties to the detriment of the 
smaller splinter parliamentary parties. In both the Polish and Bulgarian
22 R. G. Moser ‘Electoral System and the Number o f Parties in Postcommunist States’ World 
Politics 51, April 1999, pp. 359-84 at p. 360; T. Haughton ‘The Institutional Framework of 
Slovak Politics’ unpublished paper, School o f Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL, 
London University, 2001
23 B. Geddes ‘Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America’ 
in A. Lijphart & C. H Waisman (eds.) Institutional Design in New Democracies (Boulder: 




























































































examples the decision to move towards proportional systems was largely due to 
the power balance concerns of domestic politics.
Before moving on, one point deserves to be highlighted. Although, as 
with other aspects of the institutional framework, the decision to adopt variety x 
rather than variety y and later to amend x or y had much to do with the 
perceived advantages and disadvantages of the different systems for the 
political actors involved in crafting the institutional framework, political actors 
accepted the outcomes even if they were disappointing and cost them power. 
Politicians in CEEC in this regard, therefore, demonstrated their commitment to 
procedural democracy.
(e) Judicial Review
CEEC have copied Western European models by instituting judicial review, but 
they have accorded it a stronger position in their polities. Both constitutional 
courts and the very concept of constitutional review are almost completely new 
phenomena in CEEC. Only a few of the countries in the region, such as inter­
war Czechoslovakia, had pre-communist experience with constitutional courts. 
But even in the Czechoslovak case, it did not play a major role in the political 
system.
In Western Europe judicial review is a rather contested institution, as it 
makes non-elected judges politically influential, although there is no 
mechanism for holding those judges accountable. Why did the political elite and 
legal experts in CEEC allocated so much power to small groups of lawyers 
without instituting any mechanism of accountability? The answer probably lies 
in CEEC‘ communist experience and the desire for an independent and neutral 
arbiter. Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77 provides an illustrative example. That 
particular dissident movement was founded explicitly (although other ulterior 
motives were also present) to complain that the Communist government was not 
obeying its own laws on human rights. More broadly, emerging from forty years 
of Communism and into a fluid and uncertain political environment, CEEC 
were keen to see the emergence of a body which could solve conflicts about the 
interpretation of the rules of the game and at the same time protect human 
rights, including minority rights, which had been neglected and violated in the 
past.
Although all applicant countries have furnished their polities with a 
constitutional court, there are some variations. Constitution-drafters in several 
countries perceived the concept of judicial review as contrary to the main idea 
of popular and parliamentary sovereignty. Poland and Romania, for example, 




























































































designs, but limited their actual powers by allowing a special parliamentary 
majority the right to overturn the courts* decision.
The stronger version of constitutional courts in CEEC has played a 
prominent role in consolidation of democracy, as many political and legal 
disputes between ruling parties and opposition have been settled by 
constitutional jurisdiction. Their binding decisions have established a minimum 
but necessary certainty of the rules of the game. Political elites throughout the 
region have not always agreed on the interpretation of constitutional provisions 
and have at times tried to use the constitutional courts to resolve arguably non­
constitutional political disputes, but throughout Central and Eastern Europe a 
general acceptance of the courts* rulings has prevailed.
(f) Informal Rules and Unwritten Agreements in the Institutional 
Framework
The importance of informal rules in the institutional framework has been 
alluded to earlier, but before concluding it is worth reiterating. Thanks to the 
multi-party systems and fragmented parliaments in CEEC, problems are 
resolved by means of coalition bargaining, including establishment informal 
coalition bodies and formal coalition agreements, cabinet reshuffles and, if all 
else fails, early elections. Prior to 1989 these process were mostly unknown in 
the region and have needed to be learnt. However good an institutional 
structure, informal rules between political actors are essential for the successful 
functioning of a democratic polity, because not all conflicts can be managed 
through formal structures. Successful democratic institutionalisation requires an 
unwritten understanding that the change-over from one government to another 
will not harm the stability of the democracy and that the new government will 
continue along the same democratic path.
Conclusions
Central and Eastern Europe has witnessed significant institutional change since 
the end of Communism. Both Western European models and the EU have 
played an important role in the process, but domestic political factors and the 
institutional histories of the countries in the region have also been significant. 
The prevalent institutional model in CEEC consists of parliamentary 
democracy, a proportional representation electoral system, multiparty politics, 
coalition governments and constitutional review. All applicant states with the 
exception of Romania have opted for some form of parliamentary system of 
government, even if their presidents are directly elected. This framework, as 




























































































outcomes, and contributed to the consolidation of democracy.24 Moreover, the 
adoption of proportional voting systems has limited the chances of majority rule 
and the emergence of a more adversarial type of politics. It has helped to 
promote consensus and has taught political leaders of the need to craft and 
maintain coalitions, even if they have to be embedded in formalized coalition 
contracts. The reality of the last decade in Central and Eastern Europe has 
shown that in spite of a plethora of problems the main political actors in CEEC 
have, with a few exceptions, demonstrated their respect for democracy and the 
rule of law, making their countries reliable partners for EU accession. A 
paradox at the heart of the EU enlargement process, however, is that some 
institutions established to fasten adoption of EU related laws may harm the 
institutionalisation of parliamentary democracy and as well the national 
interests of candidate countries. The Bulgarian solution to this problem (as 
outlined above) appears to be a good solution, combining as it does a desire to 
fulfil the aspiration of EU membership, whilst ensuring the desire to follow the 
procedures of a consensual democracy are not thrown into the procedural 
rubbish bin.
The emerging institutional pattern in CEEC has significant consequences 
for their respective polities. As Lijphart suggested, institutional frameworks 
which promote consensus tend to yield parliaments and governments where 
sometimes fractious coalitions are more likely to predominate and where 
mustering the requisite majorities to pass legislation can be difficult.25 The 
institutional framework in CEEC has helped to hinder effective cabinet 
government, particularly in those countries where former communist or new 
nationalist forces do not sufficiently support democratic values. The obstacles 
in the way of effective executive decision-making, although theoretically 
beneficial to the fostering of a pluralist democracy, may undermine the 
institutional and organizational ability of the state to implement the social, 
economic, and administrative reforms necessary to build a modem democratic 
state on the Western European model.
Enlargement is a challenge not just for the applicant states of Central and 
Eastern Europe, but also for the institutions of the EU itself. At the Nice 
European Council, EU leaders hammered out a deal aimed at reforming the 
EU’s decision-making procedures to enable effective governance in an enlarged 
Union encompassing up to 28 states. The provisions of the Nice Treaty, 
particularly the extension of qualified majority voting, should help to ensure
24 J.J. Linz ‘The Perils o f Presidentialism’, Journal o f Democracy, 1, Winter 1990, pp. 51-69; 
J.J. Linz ‘The Virtues o f Parliamentarism’, Journal o f Democracy, no. 1, Fall 1990, pp. 84- 
91.




























































































more effective decision-making, but effective governance may require further 
reform. Coping with diversity by centralization may not be the answer. 
Effective governance in the enlarged EU requires a balance to be struck 
between a workable institutional framework for the EU and a recognition of 
diversity and complexity across the European continent.
Despite what the Eurosceptics tell us, particularly in Britain, the most 
important decision-making bodies in the EU remain those which are constituted 
of member states’ executives: the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council. Given the relatively weak position of CEEC’ executives and their 
greater dependence on fragmented parliaments, it may be wise, therefore, for 
CEEC to consider strengthening their executives in order to ensure better 
representation and articulation of their national interests within the EU 
decision-making framework and hence increase their bargaining power. The 
relative weak executive leadership in CEEC has been partly replaced by EU 
conditionality and other external pressures. The reliance on the desire to please 
external actors, particularly the EU, therefore may lead to a decrease in the 
legitimacy of the state and its institutions. One means of restoring or enhancing 
the legitimacy of the state may lie in strengthening the position of the executive. 
Procedures adopted by legislatures in CEEC to pass EU related laws highlight 
the benefits and drawbacks of such systems. The national aspiration to join the 
EU can be pursued more easily and effective governance can be increased, but it 
can hinder the emergence of the necessary democratic values including 
consensus. In politics, where good arguments exist on both sides of the debate, 
balances have to be struck. It may be wise for CEEC to place all the arguments 
back on the scales, weigh up the options and strike a new balance.
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